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Due to the recent war in Iraq, the Middle East has once against jumped to 
the forefront of everyone‘s mind. The world has been focused on Iraq and Iran for a 
decade now because Iran has established a strong foothold in Iraqi life since the 
toppling of Saddam Hussein. However, in order to understand this issue and 
attempt to solve it, an extensive study must be made of all the reasons that Iran is 
succeeding where the United States has not. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the historical influence that Iran, 
particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has had on Iraq since 
its creation. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has taken over its home 
country and a historical analysis will chronicle its rise. Case studies of Iran and 
Iraq will be used to understand the geopolitical, military, economic, and religious 
reasons for the IRGC‘s ever-increasing influence. Previous studies and news 
coverage have only focused on one issue at a time; however, it is rare to find a study 
which combines all the reasons. This thesis will not only compile an analysis of 
these reasons, but will also explore and suggest what steps or policies Iraq can 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
 Iran and Iraq have brought to mind strong memories and emotions to people 
around the world since the Ottoman and Persian Empire. The older generation 
remembers the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Ba‘ath Party takeover of Iraq in 
1968 and Saddam Hussein‘s subsequent presidency starting in 1979. Americans 
specifically tend to remember the Gulf War in 1991 led by President George H. W. 
Bush. The events of 9/11 and the Second Gulf War, initially led by President George 
W. Bush, shot the Middle East into the minds of the younger generation and 
encouraged the works of scholars to focus on that region. Clearly, the Middle East 
has been an issue that the world cannot disregard.  
Iran and Iraq have been fully aware of one another as well, with several 
struggles between Arabs and Persians going back centuries. Some scholars even 
claim that the modern era of the Middle East began with the arrival of Napoleon in 
the Ottoman Empire through Egypt in 1798, and a following new era began with 
the demise of the Ottoman Empire due to World War I.1 Therefore, it is not a 
stretch to claim that the Middle East has been a quarrelsome region in the world. 
Due to all of these events, including the Iran-Iraq War from 1980-1988, one can 
understand how scholars have attempted to understand many different aspects –
military, political, economic and  religious – of the array of issues that continue to 
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shape Iran and Iraq. These studies are critical not only for understanding such a 
complex area of the world but also to attempt to construct resolutions that benefit 
all the players involved. 
 Due to the many governmental positions that top members of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hold, some may claim that the IRGC is 
operating as if it were the government. However, it has furthered its ambitions and 
has continued to have a long standing, profound impact in Iraq as well. The IRGC‘s 
influence affects the entire system in Iraq and those within it - including the top 
government officials, the media, and the masses through their similar religious 
beliefs. Its influence is seen through military power, also known as hard power,2 but 
also through soft power, such as increased trade and greater diplomacy.3  
While the American public was glued to their televisions watching the war 
unfold, Iran was watching with equal vigor. When Saddam Hussein became the 
Iraqi leader, his secularist rhetoric was an affront to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini4, 
the prominent Shiite Imam who brought about the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and 
created the Islamic Republic of Iran.5 Therefore, the capture, and subsequent 
demise, of Saddam Hussein inspired no sympathy from the IRGC. In fact, it was 
quite the opposite; Iran saw this liberation, as the American government called it, 
as an opportunity that could not be passed by. 
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 Ironically, Iran has the same goal in Iraq as the United States – to create 
stability. However, Iran would like to see a Shiite-dominated government through 
the democratic process which would be easily achieved due to the Shiite majority in 
Iraq. In 2005, the Shiites won a near majority because Iran financially supported 
the Islamic Da‘wa party6, one of the oldest Shiite political movements in Iraq. This 
was beneficial for Iran because Ibrahim al-Jaafari , who was then the Prime 
Minister, was also the head of the Da‘wa Party and had spent the duration of the 
Iran-Iraq War in Iran.7 
 If one can peel back the layers of the IRGC‘s influence and comprehend how 
that influence is impacting the perspective of many Iraqis, then it may be easier to 
formulate a plan in which the Iraqi people can combat this influence and become 
truly autonomous. Combating the influence of the IRGC is of particular interest to 
the Unites States (US) on the level of policy perspective because if Iraq does become 
self-sufficient, it is possible for a workable relationship to be formed between the 
two nations. However, the policy that the United States takes towards Iraq will also 
influence the IRGC‘s response. Consider, for instance, if the United States 
―democratized‖ Iraq. It is highly likely that Iran will feel threatened and possibly 
invade Iraq, or in the worst-case scenario, carry out an attack against the United 
States itself – most likely though terrorist attacks.  
 Conversely, if Iran managed to establish a stable and strong voice in Iraq, 
then even if the United Nations heaped sanctions upon Iran, it could withstand 
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those because Iraq could supply Iran with what it needs to survive the onslaught. 
An additional consideration is the potential of a backlash from the Middle East 
should the UN put sanctions on both Iran and Iraq. Before any actions can be 




 Due to the varying definitions that exist for ―power‖ and ―influence‖, an 
explanation is required on how the words applied within this thesis. According to 
the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, power is ―a possession of control or authority over 
others‖ while influence is ―the act or power of producing an effect without apparent 
exertion of force or direct exercise of command.‖ 
 
Background 
 The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has been affecting their home state 
since the moment of its creation following the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, created the IRGC in order to 
protect the revolution. More specifically, the IRGC was created in order to protect 
Khomeini from possible coups by pro-monarchial protestors, as well as the US.8 
Under the current Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the IRGC has 
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acquired near immeasurable power due to the president‘s appointment of current 
and former members of the IRGC into state level and gubernatorial positions.9   
In Iraq, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has most strongly affected 
the politics, the economy and has also increased its influence by using the fact that 
both Iraq and Iran are Shiite-majority nations. After Saddam Hussein was toppled 
by the US in 2003, the IRGC entered Iraq in the hopes of stabilizing the war torn 
nation for their benefit. The IRGC has poured money for reconstruction, cheap 
goods, and services into the struggling Iraqi economy. It also provides electricity to 
various parts of Iraq and has also supplied and trained Shiite insurgents. 
Furthermore, Iran has close ties with many of the top leaders in Iraq today, most of 
whom were previous exiles from Iraq.10 
 The United States has also, by default, assisted the IRGC in its goals by 
simply toppling Hussein. There are a few factors associated with this but it is 
mainly due to the ejection of the Sunni government from power.11 This is a primary 
factor because a Shiite headed Iraqi government is much more likely to cooperate 
with the Shiite led Iran, especially since Iran allowed Iraqi refugees to enter Iran 
during the reign of the Ba‘ath regime, including current Prime Minister Nouri Al-
Maliki.12 
 However, it is far too early to claim that Iraq will become part of Iran. There 
is resistance among the Iraqi Arabs. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the head cleric 
6 
  
in Iraq, does not believe that religious figures, such as himself, should be involved 
in the government.13 Despite his extended stay in Iran, even al-Jafaari shares 
Sistani‘s views.14 A stronger source of resistance is the fact that Iraqis view 
themselves as Arabs first, not Muslims. Therefore, the tension between Iraqis and 
the Persians continues to be a divisive issue and makes the Iranian influence 
difficult to maintain.15 
 The thesis is not meant to cast judgment on Iran, Iraq, or the United States. 
Its purpose is to bring understanding to the current situation as well as a history of 
how it came to be. For any state to try to assist Iraq into becoming a self-sufficient 
state, the analysis that this thesis undertakes is crucial.  However, this thesis is 
limited in that it does not explore every option. It does not examine the effects of 
other states, such as Turkey, on Iraq. It also does not explore the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and its effect on the evolution of the current Iraqi government. These issues 
are important as well, but as Iran is Iraq‘s closest and largest neighbor, and is the 
state having the most influence on Iraq today – despite the United States‘ efforts to 
hold that position -, a thorough examination is vital. From the perspective of the 
United States, Iran is of even greater concern in the ongoing struggle to be the 
reigning hegemon. The idea that Iraq could be annexed by Iran, even figuratively16, 




CHAPTER 2 – THE RISE OF THE GUARDIANS 
 
The Birth 
 During the Iranian Revolution of 1979, also known as the Islamic Revolution, 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was deposed and replaced by Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, who had recently returned from exile. With a newly formed Islamic 
Republic in his hands, Khomeini created the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC) with the purpose of protecting the revolution from possible inside coups and 
also silencing dissenters. The IRGC was intended to be the Iranian version of the 
United States‘ National Guard, which answered only to the supreme leader.17 
 The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has many names, including the 
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, Pasdaran, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps – all of which are interchangeable. By whatever name it is known, however, 
what remains is its ever increasing influence in every aspect of Iranian life. The 
IRGC‘s influence has taken place through its main body and through its subgroups. 
These groups include not only a personal army, air force and navy, but also the 
Baseej - a home-front force, the Quds - an international force, and various other 
paramilitary forces.18 Not only does the IRGC have jurisdiction to oversee domestic 
and foreign operations, it controls Iran‘s missile forces and the IRGC alone can 





Air Force, Army and Navy 
 The IRGC is equipped with its unique ground forces, air force and navy. 
Unfortunately, due to a lack of solid information flowing from Iran, it is extremely 
difficult to ascertain how many men are involved in these forces. In 2006, the 
Pasdaran Air Force was reported to operate three Shabab-3 missiles.20 The Shabab-
3 is a ballistic missile of intermediate range – 1,000 km – which are based on the 
design of North Korea‘s No Dong-1 missile. The No Dong-1 is capable of carrying up 
to an 800 kg warhead.21 However, in 2008, new information showed that Iran has 
up to 100 Shabab-3 missiles that have been modified and can now reach up to 1,600 
km and deliver a 1,158 kg warhead. In addition, Iran also has been developing the 
Shabab-6 missile, which can reach roughly 10,000 km and deliver a 1,220 kg 
warhead.22 Clearly, Iran is quickly developing their ballistic missile capability along 
with its quest for nuclear capability. 
 The ground forces of the IRGC are composed of an ―army‖ and all 
paramilitary forces, including the Baseej. Together they have been reported to be 
composed of 130,000 men. This estimate includes the soldiers in the regular army. 
The structure of the ground forces is uncertain but they conduct a variety of 
training exercises in decentralized, guerilla warfare, most of which are meant to 
9 
  
prepare the soldiers against an attack by the United States. They are in control of 
the tanks, attack helicopters and IEDs (improvised explosive devices).23 The IRGC 
navy is in control of a variety of ships and bases that protect oil platforms but also 
ensure basic defense for Iran. Furthermore, this navy, composed of roughly 25,000 
men, is capable of conducting various exercises, similar to US Marines, and raids on 
other shipping vessels in the Gulf.24 
 
Baseej-e Mostazafan – Mobilization Resistance Force 
 The Baseej (Basij) Force is a volunteer militia created simultaneously with 
the IRGC by Khomeini in 1979, although it did not come officially under the control 
of the IRGC until 1981.25  It is estimated that about 800,000 Baseej volunteers were 
sent to the front line of the Iran-Iraq War and were the main force responsible for 
martyr-style deaths during that time.26 Today, the Baseej is entrusted with internal 
riot suppression as well as controlling the dissenters, whether they are peaceful or 
not. Because it is composed of average volunteers from all walks of life, such as 
farmers, teachers, students, government workers and various other sectors27, the 
Baseej also is used to draw information from the public – similar to a secret police - 
, and to ensure that Islamic Sharia law is followed.28 Baseej numbers are difficult to 
attain given that so little information is provided by the IRGC; however, in 2008 the 
then commander of the Baseej, Hasan Taeb, reported to Fars News that 13.6 
million people are in the Baseej. This number includes women and schoolchildren; 
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therefore, how many military age men and women are able to pick up arms is still 
disputed.29 
 There are five units within the Baseej – Pupil (also called Seekers), Student 
(Vanguard)30, University, Public Service and Tribal. The Pupils are school-aged 
children who are indoctrinated into the system at an early age and inculcate the 
next generation.31 Also, the Baseej is separated into men‘s and women‘s battalions. 
Al-Zahra is the women‘s battalion while Ashura is the men‘s. Together they are 
composed of roughly 2,500 battalions.32  
 The Baseej has been trained to attack US military troops should they invade 
Iran. Through their practice of deception and camouflage that is capable of 
deceiving modern imagery coverage, they have practiced dispersing into smaller 
teams and executing effective ambushes. This is a useful arrangement because each 
small Baseej team could work independently of a central command; thus making 
them harder to find and extract information from. They are meant to be a strike 
force and attack isolated units.33  
 Throughout the years, the Baseej has been in limbo between being under 
direct control of the IRGC and being its own separate organization. In 1981, the 
Baseej went under the control of the Ministry of the Interior; however, it never 
actually separated itself from the IRGC.34 In 2007, Major Mohammad Ali Jafari was 
appointed as the Commander and Chief of the IRGC by Grand Ayatollah Ali 
11 
  
Khamenei.  Jafari officially merged the Baseej into the IRGC due to his assessment 
that both the Baseej and the IRGC were a ―military-political-cultural organization 
sharing the same goals…‖35 He also stated that since many of the IRGC‘s missions 
are assigned to the Baseej, they should be combined. However, Jafari also promised 
that the Baseej would not be swallowed into the IRGC.36 
 Conversely, since the 2009 election, and the riots that followed, some scholars 
are speculating that the Baseej is deteriorating. Particularly after the Baseej shot 
many protesters, its leadership role in suppressing opposition has been minimal.37  
In addition, Hossen Taeb was removed from his position as leader of the Baseej in 
October 2009 and the Baseej was officially integrated with the IRGC under 
Brigadier General Muhammad Naghdi.38 
 
The Quds Forces - The Jerusalem Forces 
 Within the IRGC, the Quds are the elite force. The majority of their missions 
are composed of international operations. They work with Hezbollah in Lebanon 
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The Quds force 
has even been reported to have ongoing operations in Argentina.39 Their primary 
objective is the training of Islamist terrorist groups and organizations. The Quds 
operate in many states including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North African 
countries.40 Furthermore, the Quds force has had increasing influence in Iraq since 
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the Iran-Iraq War. Roughly 12,000 Arabic-speaking Shiites from various countries 
make up the Quds branch of the IRGC and roughly 15,000 Iranian Shiites are in 
the Quds.41 In Iraq, the Quds have made efforts to infiltrate Iraq‘s southern region, 
which contains a large Shiite majority. 42 In Iraq, the Quds do not wear uniforms, 
whether military or other, making them difficult to identify in the nation. However, 
they engage in both recruitment/training and locating pro-Iran Shiite governors in 
each province where they operate. In addition, they organize the shipment of 
weapons from Iran to Iraqi militias.43 General Petraeus, the commander of the 
American forces in Iraq, reported to Congress in 2007 that the US had found Quds 
operatives in Iraq and with them, found hard drives that had documents planning 
and approving an attack that resulted in the death of five American soldiers in 
Karbala.44 
 The Quds force has different groups for each country that they operate within 
and many of their bases are outside of Iran. In addition, this force has offices in 
various Iranian embassies, although the sections of these embassies are closed off to 
all other staff. Due to the lack of knowledge about this branch of the IRGC, it is 
unknown whether or not the ambassadors themselves have control of or any 
knowledge about what the Quds do within the embassy or the country where they 
reside.45 Additionally, the Quds work closely with the IRGC Intelligence Branch, 
which is made up of roughly 2,000 members. This branch is entrusted with 
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gathering information from everywhere in the Muslim world and participating in 
the trials of those accused of working against the Revolution.46 
 Another speculation is whether or not the funds for the Quds force are 
actually recorded in the Iranian budget or if they get special funds directly from the 
Supreme Leader Khamenei. If Khamenei supplements the Quds‘s funding, they 
may have more funds at their disposal than anyone is aware of. The biggest 
example of their power and influence, however, occurred in January 2007, when 
Iran‘s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), transferred control of all Iranian 
operations in Iraq under the Quds authority.47 
 
Increasing Influence 
 Since their creation, the IRGC has been used for a variety of tasks both 
within and outside of Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini used the Guards to silence 
dissenters of the revolution and political adversaries early on, although he did not 
agree with the politicization of the Guards.48 In his ―Political and Divine 
Testament‖, Khomeini said that no military personnel were to involve themselves in 
any form of politics, including joining a political party. Furthermore, Khomeini 
emphasized that military leaders should forbid, without exception, the entrance of 
their subordinates into political practices.49  
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 Despite this rhetoric, Khomeini immediately used the IRGC to completely 
purge the political system in Iran. The first party to feel the might of the new IRGC 
was the Tudeh Party. This communist party was accused of being followers of Stalin 
and was vilified by national papers until its leaders were imprisoned. Following the 
Tudeh Party, the next to feel the might of the new IRGC was the then Prime 
Minister Bazargan who had tried to persuade Ayatollah Khomeini to not involve the 
Guards in politics. However, the Prime Minister was forced to resign following the 
hostage crisis.50 The trend continued even after Khomeini‘s death and the Guards 
soon succeeded in ousting Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, the first president of the Islamic 
Republic. This attack came after Bani-Sadr tried to rein in the Guards‘ already 
growing voice in the political arena.51  
 Following Bani-Sadr, Ali Khamenei and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani both 
attempted but failed to depoliticize the Guards during their respective presidencies. 
Rafsanjani even went so far as bribing the IRGC members to stay away from 
politics; however, this backfired because his bribes were used to fund the IRGC's 
agenda which was composed of accusing Rafsanjani of being a liberal.52 The Guards 
used every source available to their disposal to further their reach.  
 Even the courts were used to silence the media and other dissenters, starting 
after Mohammad Khatami took the presidency in 1997. Many papers and 
magazines, including student publications, were banned throughout Khatami‘s 
presidency. Reasons included the amount of criticism that the IRGC was facing due 
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to its involvement in politics and the belief that intellectuals must respect the 
Guards because they protect the revolution.53 
 
Pasdaran Influence Today 
 Despite these leaps of political influence, at no time has the IRGC gained so 
much power and influence as under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  The 
IRGC, particularly the Baseej, helped quell political protests after the disputed 
presidential election in June 2009. The Guards now hold various political positions 
throughout Iran. These positions include mayors, cabinet ministers – of commerce, 
defense, oil, welfare, and justice-, and top leaders at the state-run economic 
institutions. 54 
 The top members of the IRGC are also heavily involved in Iran‘s nuclear 
program. Between 2006 and 2007, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, the IRGC 
commander, Brigadier General Morteza Rezai, the Deputy Commander, as well as 
the leaders of the naval branch, ground forces – including the al-Quds and the 
Baseej, had their assets frozen under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolution 1747.55 The fact that the UN targeted specific commanders in the 
resolution shows how deeply entrenched the IRGC is in Iran. The IRGC commands 
and operates all of Iran‘s Scud missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and 
researches new military technologies. Furthermore, the IRGC controls Iran‘s 
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defense industry and buys arms and military parts through many cover 
organizations.56  
 With all this power within its own county, along with its fanatical dogma, it 
is no wonder that outside global institutions, such as the UN, are having such a 
difficult time keeping a rein on the IRGC. Now that Iraq is in a transition phase 
and the US public and government is insisting on a pullout from the region, Iran is 











CHAPTER 3 – THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 
CORPS IN IRAQ 
 
 The IRGC is still very much supportive of Khomeini‘s dream, including the 
idea of exporting the revolution throughout the world. With this belief and the 
current unstable nature of Iraq, it comes as no surprise that Iran has begun to move 
into the state. This influence has taken many forms, including political, military, 
economic, and religious. In addition, the IRGC uses its previous political ties, the 
media, and religious rhetoric to spread its belief. Both the IRGC and the United 
States acknowledge that US forces cannot be in Iraq forever while Iran is right next 
door.57 This poses a threat to Iraq‘s attempt at becoming fully autonomous due to 
Iran‘s constant and pervasive reach. 
 
Why IRGC Vies For Power 
 The reasons for Iran‘s interest in Iraq are speculative; however, all are 
plausible. Iran could use Iraq as a buffer zone, or as an additional ally, should any 
outside powers decide to attack. If the IRGC can create enough of an influence in 
Iraq and keep it weak enough to prevent another powerful dictator – who disagrees 
with them – from coming to power, then Iraq will be under Iran‘s thumb.58 
Politically, if Iran took over Iraq, they could propagate the religious factor, 
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suggesting that this new control is a sacred mandate and legitimizes the role of the 
Iranian government as it stands, and thus has the right to crush any calls for 
political reform. Essentially, Iran‘s interest in Iraq is a mixture of domestic interest 
and religious aspirations. 
 Considering their similar Shiite beliefs, Iran could hope to strengthen the 
relationship between the two countries. Even Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is from 
Iran.59 Also, two of the holiest cities in the Shiite sect of Islam, Narjaf and Karbala, 
are located in Iraq. Better relations would encourage more pilgrimage between the 
two nations.60  Also, due to the Iran-Iraq War, there were many exiles in Iran, 
making, Iran‘s influence even stronger with those ex-refugees, many whom hold 
prominent positions in the Iraqi government today. 
 Lastly, Iran feels overtly threatened with the Unites States‘ influence in the 
region. However, the IRGC has to be very careful in how it approaches the 
situation. On the one hand, it does not want all out civil war because that could spill 
over into their borders.  Furthermore, a civil war could also recreate the same 
situation as the Iran-Iraq War in which many refugees poured into Iran. A rise in 
refugees could further destabilize the Iranian Kurdish and Arab citizens.61 In 
addition, although the IRGC does not want an Iraq that is friendly with the West, it 
is to its benefit to want democracy in Iraq because of the Shiite majority.62 Through 
the different tactics demonstrated below, one can see how it is attempting to 




 Due to Saddam Hussein‘s early ousting of Shiites to Iran, coupled with 
Shiites who left of their own accord, Iran had many Iraqi exiles and refugees living 
within its borders until the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.63  The Quds force was a 
main reason for the creation of the Badr Corps, which were made up of Iraqi exiles 
in Iran and operated under the Quds.64 The Badr Corps received around $20 million 
a year to support the revolution and conduct operations with the purpose of 
assassinating Saddam Hussein.65 Though the war was a military failure on both 
sides, leaving one million dead and roughly three million wounded66, Iran continued 
holding an influence on the Badr Corps in Iraq.  
 After the 1991 Gulf War, the Badr were called upon to recruit members from 
the various Shiite exiles. The Badr Corps also created network which they used to 
ease smuggling people and arms into Iraq, still with the overall purpose of 
assassinating Hussein and destroying the Mujahideen-e Khalq, which were Iranian 
exiles who cooperated with the Ba‘ath Party because they believed in overthrowing 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.67 In 2003, under tremendous outside pressure, the 
Badr Corps became the Badr Organization; however, it continued to receive 
monetary support from Iran and numbered around 10,000 men.68  Furthermore, 
many Badr members were given positions in the Iraqi government and some 
incorporated into the Iraqi Security Forces.69  
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 The Badr Organization is now acting as a police force in many areas in 
southern Iraq, such as Basra.70 With the growing amount of sectarian violence 
between the Sunnis and Shiites, the monetary assistance from Iran to the Badr 
causes a major problem; furthermore, the Badr have also been pursuing former 
Ba‘athist leaders, both military and political, in order to exact revenge for the Iran-
Iraq War.71 If a civil war were to erupt, it would cause Iraq to remain weak; thus 
being more malleable towards Iranian interests.72 However, to reiterate, it is more 
beneficial for Iraq to be somewhat stable as to prevent the civil war from spilling 
over into Iran‘s borders. 
 The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has supported many other groups as 
well, namely the Jaish al Mahdi (JAM), the personal militia of Moqtada al-Sadr – a 
radical Shiite cleric in Iraq.73 JAM was trained by the Lebanese Hezbollah, 
particularly Ali Mussa Daqduq, who also received training by the IRGC, and after 
2004, the IRGC began giving JAM ―explosively formed penetrators‖ (EFPs) and 
other weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades and rocket launchers.74  In April 
2004, JAM engaged US troops both in Baghdad and Najaf while attempting to 
annihilate the Sunni population.75 EFPs are especially dangerous because they are 
shaped like copper disks and can penetrate heavy armor by the sheer power of the 
explosives.76 JAM also started to be trained in Iran by the Hezbollah as well as the 
Quds.77 A reason for Iran to furnish such support for JAM is that this militia has 
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become the scapegoat for insurgent sectarian violence, thus taking attention away 
from the Badr Organization and making it seem less responsible.78 
 After 2006, the Quds separated the Iraq militias into cells, similar to 
Hezbollah. Qais Khazali was chosen to head the new network because of his close 
relations with Sadr. The new organization was named Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and 
Ali Mussa Daqduq was the middleman between the AAH and the Quds. Funding for 
this new network was generous, being somewhere between $750,000 to 3 million 
dollars in arms and training.79 The 2007 killing of five US soldiers at the Karbala 
Provincial Joint Coordination Center, in addition to the kidnapping of five British 
citizens in Baghdad, was attributed to the AAH.  After the attack, much evidence 
was gathered, which resulted in the arrest of Khazali and Daqduq. Three of the 
kidnapped men were killed and Peter Moore was held by the Quds force for two 
years before his release. The condition of his freedom was the release of Qais al-
Khazali, a leading cleric in the AAH. It was found that Moore was a target of the 
IRGC and the AAH because he was installing a system that would show how a large 
amount of international aid was in fact being used to fund Iranian militia groups in 
Iraq.80 The attacks continued through 2008. And even today, there are still 
insurgents who continue to go to Iran for training, then return to Iraq and attack 




 Along with military influence, Iran has been exerting its political arm in Iraq. 
Because of the rush of Iraqi exiles returning after Saddam, coupled with the 
debaathification process led by the US, Iran has managed to become extremely 
involved in Iraqi politics. Under Lieutenant Paul Bremer, the 2003 debaathification 
process had two steps. First, it made the Ba‘ath Party illegal and dismissed roughly 
some 30,000 ex-Ba‘athists from their government positions; second, it purged the 
Iraqi military of roughly 500,000 members.82  Although Bremer attempted to 
dismantle the debaathification commission after claiming it was implemented 
unjustly and poorly, Iraq‘s interim government decided to keep the debaathification 
process in place.83  
 Interestingly enough, however, Iran has been favorable towards the 
democratic process in Iraq. Their support is only harnessed because, since Iraq is 
mostly Shiite – roughly 60% -,84 the IRGC understands that a democratic process 
would easily launch the Shiites into power. Indeed, in 2005, the Shiites did gain 
political power under the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), who won 128 of the 275 seats 
in December of 2005.85 The UIA includes the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(ISCI), previously known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), and the Da‘wa (Islamic Call) party, which is very pro-Iranian.86 
Furthermore, Moqtada al-Sadr is included in the UIA, and since Sadr is currently 
in Iran studying to become an Imam87, his inclusion is beneficial to the IRGC. 
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 The ISCI was created under Ayatollah Khomeini and control the Badr 
Brigades, or the Badr Organization as it is now referred to.  During the Iran-Iraq 
War, the ISCI fought for the Iranian side. The previous ISCI leader, Abdul Aziz al- 
Hakim, returned from Iran in 2003 and was also the head of the UIA. Al-Hakim 
was pushing for an autonomous southern province in Iraq, specifically for Shiites. 
Iran fully supported this legislation because an autonomous Shiite area would 
theoretically turn to Iran for any economic and political assistance.88  His son, 
Sayyed Ammar al-Hakim now heads the party.  Another member of ISCI was 
Humam Hamoudi, the Chair of Constitutional Committee, who worked closely with 
al-Hakim. Finally, the former commander of the Badr Brigade, Bayan Jabr, was a 
senior member of the UIA and served as the Ministry of the Interior. He served as a 
member of the ISCI bureau in Lebanon and Syria after living in exile in Iran during 
the Iran-Iraq War.89 
Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and current Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki are both members of the Da‘wa Party. Al-Jaafari was the head of the 
Da‘wa Party during his term as Prime Minister and had spent ten years in exile in 
Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, though he later moved to London.90 Nouri al-Maliki 
was a resistance fighter in Iraq during Saddam‘s reign, although he fled after 
learning of several assassination attempts planned for him. Even so, there were still 
attempts on his life. He first went to Jordan, then to Syria, and lastly to Iran in 
1982 where he lived for eight years. In 1990 he returned to Syria until 2003, after 
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Saddam was deposed. Prior to his appointment as the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri 
al-Maliki was a member of the Debaathification Committee from 2003 to 2005 and 
the Head of the Defense Committee from 2005 to 2006.  91 
 In 2005, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, called Iran a ―brother 
country‖ and had been cooperating with Iran in order to root out terrorism and 
deepen relations between the two states.92 The relationship between Iran and Iraq 
is expected to grow according to almost all leaders on both sides. The concern is 
whether or not Iraq will continue to maintain its autonomy despite the increasingly 
expanding influence of Iran. 
 
Economic Influence 
 In addition to military and political influence, Iran and the IRGC have been 
extensively working on become inexorably intertwined with the Iraqi economy. This 
has included the influx of Iranian goods into the Iraqi economy and the ―donation‖ 
of funds towards Iraqi reconstruction, while providing energy to certain key areas in 
Iraq. 
 Due to the tremendous economic sanctions in Iraq during the 1990‘s, the 
Iraqi economy had been on a downward spiral, which had been exacerbated by 
sectarian violence throughout the country throughout the stay of the US troops.93 
When the United States took over in 2003, the US Coalition Provisional Authority 
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opened the economy by suspending duties and tariffs on imported goods in hopes of 
jump-starting the devastated economy. Unfortunately, this opened up the Iraqi 
economy to Iran, which wasted no time sweeping into the nation.94 
 In a short time, Iran has become Iraq‘s largest trading partner. In 2006, 
Iranian exports were over $1.8 billion – a large leap from $800 million just two 
years earlier. Assisting this increase was the free-trade zone in the south, 
particularly Basra, where the rial – Iranian currency – is used. 95 A commonly cited 
statistic in 2007 showed that since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the trade between 
Iran and Iraq has grown steadily by 30% a year.96  By 2009, bilateral trade was 
estimated at $4 billion.97 Furthermore, Iran has also subsidized its exports to Iraq, 
which lowers the price of Iranian goods in Iraqi markets. While Iran is subsidizing 
its exports to Iraq, at the same time it has also raised import tariffs to 150%, 
making it impossible to maintain a trade balance.98 
 However, these estimates are somewhat uncertain due to the lack of numbers 
being released from Iran.99 The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister of Finance, Barham 
Salih, claims this is a problem because it is a one-way trade. The Iraqi Foreign 
Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurd, claims that there are a number of agreements 
between Iran and Iraq regarding trade, energy, oil and pilgrims. 100 Most Shiite 
political leaders in Iraq today say that this relationship will only strengthen. Iran is 
attempting to double trade to $8 billion by the end of 2010.101 
26 
  
 Even today, however, Baghdad is overrun with Iranian air conditioners, 
books, busses, rice, and bricks - something Iraq was renowned for.102  Basra alone 
imports $45 million worth of a variety of goods including construction materials, 
fish, carpets and spices, according to Muhammad al-Waeli, the governor of Basra.103 
In many cases, Iran is truly providing products at a cheap price that Iraqi‘s could 
not otherwise afford. However, in the case of bricks, for example, Iran is 
undermining local businesses, which is destroying job creation in the fragile nation. 
Many Iraqi businessmen and manufacturers feel that this is not fair because Iraq is 
not strong enough to compete without enacting protectionist policies.  
 In Nahrwan, a city located just northeast of Iraq, many brick factories are 
going out of business due to imports from Iran.104 One brick factory owner, Dhary 
al-Shimary, is extremely worried about having to shut down his factory again. 
Though he was able to hire back many of his workers, the factory was attacked by 
Al-Qaeda and most of his transformers were damaged. Shimary is worried about 
what his workers will do if they are jobless.  With a 28% unemployment rate for 
males between 15 and 29, may worry about how they will feed their families. One 
worker claims that he used to work for Sunni insurgents and plant explosives, not 
for shared beliefs, but because they paid him well.105 
 Electricity is another crucial necessity for Iraq and it may cause some to 
think Iran is being selfless towards its Shiite neighbors; however, the reliance of 
Iraq on Iranian energy only gives Iran another way to manipulate the populace. 
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Basra was shown this first hand when, in 2008, Iran shut down the electricity to 
Basra following the Iraqi‘s government attempt at a crackdown. Even though they 
did eventually restart the electricity, the Iraqi government has still to transfer the 
electricity sector back to Iraq. 106  
 The border cities along the Iran-Iraq border are where much of Iranian funds 
can be seen in the form of electricity. According to the Iraqi electricity minister, 
Karm Wahid, Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, will soon have the capacity to 
draw 250 megawatts of power from Iran for only 5.2 cents per kilowatt-hour. Dilaya 
Province, which is northeast of Baghdad, imports 120 megawatts for a slightly 
higher price.107 Altogether, as of 2009, Iran supplies 750 Megawatts of electricity to 
Iraq as well as supplying fuel to several power stations in Iraq.108 
 Iran has also become very involved in the banking system in Iraq, so much so 
that in 2007 Bank Melli opened a branch in Baghdad. Bank Melli has been tagged 
by the US Treasury as being the main bank that purchases materials for Iran‘s 
nuclear ambitions and funds the Quds Force, which, in turn, funds the insurgent 
militias in Iraq.109 Other banks involved are the Tejarat Bank and the Export 
Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), who have opened branches in Sulaymaniyah, 
and several others have opened in Karbala, Najaf and Baghdad.110 Could it be that 
the Iraqi populace simply does not know about the connection of these banks to the 
insurgent militias in their country? And if they did know, what could cause them to 
ignore this connection? For the government it could be a matter of going along with 
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Iran for the time being, considering their unstable position; however, for the people 




 Finally, one of the most difficult aspects to combat when it comes to curbing 
influences is the religious ties between Iran and Iraq. With only four Middle 
Eastern countries holding a Shiite majority, and only three having a Shiite-led 
government, similar religious beliefs form close ties among those of the same faith; 
however, these ties are being manipulated by Iran to spread their power. 
 Looking back to the Iran-Iraq War, Iran took in many Shiite exiles, and so, 
was sympathetic to their cause in Iraq. Also, Iran has donated a considerable 
amount of funds towards the reconstruction of Najaf and Karbala, two of the holiest 
cities in Shiite belief. Najaf was provided with $20 million a year in order to 
improve the city for tourists. Karbala received even more funds and was part of a 
$100 million project to renovate the area around the shrines of Imam Hussein and 
his brother, Abu Fadhil al-Abbas – prominent figures in Shiite Islam. 111 
 Two schools of thought rule Shiite Islam regarding politics – Quietism and 
the Khomeinist tradition. As their name suggests, the Quietists believe that clerics 
should never become involved in politics. Instead, clerics should focus on leading 
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their followers. The Najaf Hawza, the older Shiite seminary, adheres to this 
tradition.112 Conversely, those who follow the Khomeinist tradition believe that 
clerics should control everything, including politics, religious and social matters. 
The Qom Hawza follows the Khomeinist vision113, as Qom is the city in which 
Khomeini lived during the periods he was in Iran. The rebirth of Najaf as a center 
for Shiite learning has brought a challenge to Qom and to the Iranian Shiite belief 
about religious control of the government.  Thus, by investing in the reconstruction 
of Najaf and Karbala, Iran could be planning on controlling what emerges out of the 
competing hawzas.114 
 Also, media is a common way in which governments try to influence and 
control the populace, particularly in lesser democratic nations. The IRGC, however, 
has taken to spreading its message in Iraq through its own television stations.  Iran 
has a channel that broadcasts in Iraq called Al-Alam. It began in 2003 and 
broadcasted propaganda which compared US coalition troops to the Israelis in 
Palestine. Al-Kawthar, which started up in 1997, is another Iranian station that 
broadcasts in Iraq. Previously known as Al-Sahar, it is mostly neutral on Iraqi 
affairs; however, the station is extremely anti-Israel and refers to it as the 
―usurping entity‖. Not much better is said about the Unites States due to the 
station‘s support of the Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestine‘s Hamas.115  
 Social influence in Iraq is tied to religious influence but has more immediate 
visible repercussions.  For instance, parts of the IRGC have infiltrated southern 
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Iraqi cities and are enforcing Sharia. They are forcing women to wear hijab, as well 
as beating and/or killing unaccompanied women or couples that are not related to 
one another. 116 Though religious in intent, the IRGC is destabilizing the current 
social standards of many Iraqis and gearing them towards acceptance of and strict 
adherence to Sharia law. 
 It is clear that Iran is entrenching itself in the creation of the new Iraq. Even 
though President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad said that Tehran has ―one soul in two 
bodies‖, and went onto say that Iran is fully supportive of a democratic Iraq, it is 
highly possible that this statement is only valid as long as Iraq gives unilateral 










CHAPTER 4 – ALL IS NOT LOST 
 
Present Pockets of Resistance 
Despite mounting concerns regarding Iraq‘s future as an independent and 
self-sufficient nation, there are still those who resist the IRGC‘s encroachment. 
Many Sunnis are extremely wary and sensitive about the IRGC‘s growing influence. 
Their concern is both due to their minority status and because, as some insurgent 
militias have shown, Sunnis are being singled out for victimization – particularly 
the ex-Ba‘athists.  Iranian influence only serves to heighten the tension between the 
factions and cause Sunnis to fear that they will become the silenced minority in 
Iraq. Some Shia‘s are equally upset at the reach of Iran‘s hand within Iraq, though 
for different reasons than the Sunnis. Although they share the same faith, Iraqi 
Shiites are Arab, unlike their Persian counterparts in Iran. This divide has been 
present for centuries and continues to be a primary divisive issue.117 Furthermore, 
many Shiites disagree with the theocratic dictatorship in Iran and are infuriated 
with the IRGC‘s attempts to infiltrate their country and enforce their code of law. 
Although Sharia law is a Muslim code, not all Muslims believe it should be the 
enforced justice code. 
 Lastly, there is still much resentment and anger remaining from the Iran-
Iraq War. Although not many Iraqis believed in fighting for Saddam Hussein, many 
of them lost relatives in the war and harbor that loss to this day. To be aware of an 
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insidious Iranian takeover, even though it is not military, is to perceive that the 
Iran-Iraq War is being lost. Although powerful, these pockets of resistance are not 
enough to push back Iran or the IRGC. The Iraqi government has to take action in 
order to secure its autonomy. There are choices, of course, on how the government 
should approach this task – whether through military, political or economic means. 
However, any of these options or combinations will be met with fierce resistance 
and, therefore require preparation. These preparations will require the assistance 
not only from the international community, but also the cooperation of the 
government leaders – a difficult task when one considers how many of the members 
still harbor loyalty towards Iran.  
 
Military Options 
Iraq has been taking steps to stabilize the nation with the help of the United 
States and partially from Iran. However, Iraq has not resolved to take direct 
military action against Iran due to many reasons. The most daunting reason is that 
Iran could incite more violence should they feel threatened by Iraq. Conversely, 
since 2007 the United States has officially been searching for IRGC members in 
Iraq, after President Bush admitted that he did order the missions to combat the 
IRGC and end their aid to insurgents.118 Unfortunately, President Bush also 
declined a request from the Iraq Study Group – a ten-person bipartisan group 
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funded by Congress to assess the situation in Iraq and ways to resolve the many 
issues surrounding the new government -119  to open negotiation with Tehran in 
order to find a common ground on how to end sectarian violence in Iraq.120 
Instead, the US and Iraq have employed some of the militias with the 
purpose of quelling the violence. Specifically, the United States has agreements 
with the Sunni militia named al-Sahwa121, and the Shiite militia named The Wolf 
Brigade.122 Both brigades are powerful forces in Iraq because they are additions to, 
though not part of, the official army of Iraq. Though this action seems to be a 
tangible step towards calming the populace of Iraq, the hired brigades have been 
accompanied by their own internal hassles, and the issue of whether or not they are 
to be incorporated into the official security forces is raising tensions among several 
factions in Iraq.123 
 Al-Sahwa (Awakening) was initially formed in order to decrease bloodshed in 
Azamiyah, a city just north of Baghdad, after a call to arms from a local imam, 
Sheik Ahmed Taha al Samarrai.124 Soon after, the US forces took over and formally 
trained the militia and recruited members from neighboring Sunni clans. These 
men, roughly 80,000, were receiving about $300 per month from the US in order to 
combat al-Qaeda and not attack US troops. Presumably, the latter condition was 
necessary because the same troops had been fighting against US troops earlier 




 The Wolf Brigade was started in October 2004 by Abu Walid, a nom de 
guerre. Walid is an ISCI member and a former three-star general. This brigade 
consists of about 2,000 predominantly young Shiite men from Sadr City.126 
Although they dress much like the Saddam Hussein‘s Republican Guard, in red 
berets and olive colored uniforms, they have been performing operations in Mosul 
against the resident Sunni population. The Wolf Brigade members earn roughly 
$400 per month, and though they are not usually paid by the US, there is much 
cooperation between the two.127 The Wolf Brigade is so well known in Iraq that, not 
only do they have their own TV show – Terrorism in the Grip of Justice - which 
shows them capturing insurgents and questioning them, yet allegedly the US troops 
use their name as a threat should any prisoners refuse to cooperate. This militia is 
extremely controversial, especially since the execution of six Sunni clerics has 
further heightened tensions.128 The television show, which appears on a US-funded 
Iraqi station, has been heavily criticized by the international community because it 
violates the Geneva Convention by publicly humiliating detainees.129 
 A potential problem with the two brigades is that they are based on sectarian 
or ethnic identities. Therefore, it could be construed as discrimination if one of the 
militias entered an area populated with a different sect or ethnicity. Due to their 
often tribal identities, it is questionable whether or not they are loyal to the 
national government.130 Furthermore, not all of these militias can be officially 
integrated into the security forces of Iraq.  Many of the Sunni brigades worry that 
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they will not be among the chosen ones to be integrated because of their different 
faiths.131 This could lead to civil war because the Sunnis would feel disenfranchised.  
Conversely, if there were Sunni brigades integrated, it could also spark sectarian 
warfare among other groups. Kurds would be especially worried due to their 
previous relationship with Sunni forces.132  
 Whichever brigades are left out of the integration process will also lose faith 
in the government, according to the Iraqi Defense Minister, and could also give 
these groups, which are now armed, a reason to rebel.133 In October 2010, rumors 
began about the al-Sahwa forces defecting to al-Qaeda because of their non-
integration into the security forces.134 These rumors have been strongly denied by 
the leaders who claim that al-Sahwa is there to rid Iraq of terrorists and have 
already sacrificed a large number of their members in their effort.135 Furthermore, 
many of the al-Sahwa members have been integrated across various agencies while 
others have been recruited for civilian jobs within the government.136 Clearly Iraq is 
in an extremely precarious position; however, lacking another option regarding the 
security of such a large country, it seems that this is the most appropriate choice for 
today. 
 Iraq could pull these militias and brigades together in order to combat 
Iranian interference, particularly in southern Iraq, where Iranian influence is most 
prominent.  There are calls for Iraq to cleanse the south of the Quds force and Iran 
in general, as well as petitions circulating calling for a UN investigation into 
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Iranian meddling in Iraq. The initial call came from Sheik Jasim al-Kadhim, 
president of the Association of Nationalist and Independent Iraqi Tribes, who 
claims that the only solution for Iraq is the ousting of the encroaching Iranian 
regime. The petition has thus far been signed by 14 members of the clergy, upwards 
of 600 sheiks and roughly 25,000 women of southern Iraq.137 Additionally, over 
300,000 Iraqi Shiites signed another petition to end Iranian terrorism in Iraq.138 In 
order to combat the Iranian influence in the south, the Iraqi government could 
dispatch joint forces made up of official security forces and Shiite brigades – 
theoretically avoiding sectarian violence. 
 
Political Options 
 Along with military steps that the Iraqi government could take to curb the 
influence of the IRGC, there are also political steps. Of course, this requires 
navigating a narrow path that could be potentially costly to several members of the 
Iraqi government, especially when many of them are Shiite and have, thus far, been 
loyal to Iran. Within the political arena of Iraq, there are already those who 
disagree with the pervasive Iranian influence, including current Prime Minister 
Nouri Al- Maliki. Although Maliki has praised Iran previously for its help in 
reconstructing Iraq, as well as combating terrorism139, Maliki has harbored 
resentment towards Iran. 
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 In Maliki‘s case in particular, after fleeing to Iran to avoid being assassinated 
by Hussein, Maliki began to work for the IRGC who was engaging in attempting to 
assassinate Hussein and topple the Sunni government during the Iran-Iraq War.140 
During one of his covert runs, he needed a clearance to get into a border area; 
however, he was sent on a twelve-hour drive to speak to another official who 
promptly denied his application. Later, when Saddam was threatening to airstrike 
the refugee town of Ahwaz – where many of the Iraqi refugees had fled to during 
one of Saddam‘s many purges of the Da‘wa Party – Maliki, a member of said party, 
had to transport his wife, who had just given birth and had an IV in her arm, to 
another city since no Iranian would come to help.141 Events like those have caused 
Maliki to have a deep distrust for the Iranians. 
The Da‘wa Party, although Shiite, is an Iraqi party. Iran took Da‘wa Party 
members in and gave them an abandoned oil camp near the Iranian city, Ahwaz, to 
make their home. Other Da‘wa members who defected from Saddam‘s Army 
military trained the nonmilitary refugees.142 However, the Da‘wa members and Iran 
came to an impasse when the Iranians continued to try to take over the guerillas 
and lead the war against Saddam. Another crucial point was that the refugees 
disliked the Islamic government that Iran had. Out of this conflict, the ISCI was 
born, with some members of Da‘wa joining but most refusing and/or dropping out. 
Maliki was one of those who refused.143  
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Though Iran does exert influence, there are Iraqi leaders who are less than 
thrilled at the prospect of taking orders from Iran, particularly because of the Arab-
Persian divide, but also because Iran still pursues its own national interests with 
very little regard to Iraq despite the shared Shiite faith. In return, Iraq has begun 
using Iran as a threat to its Arab neighbors in order to gain some benefits. Since 
becoming Prime Minister of Iraq, Maliki has been attempting to put further 
separate himself from Iran. In 2004 and 2005, many Shiite politicians were running 
for government positions on the platform of independence from Iran because they 
were aware that their constituency base would be eroded should they not separate 
from Iran.144  
ISCI had also been doing well in elections throughout Iraq, but in the 
January 2009 elections the Da‘wa Party managed to defeat the ISCI in local 
elections. 145  With tensions rising, Iran has been insisting that Maliki work with 
the ISCI.146 Though Maliki is willing to have a coalition, it is unlikely that he will 
allow Iran to dictate the direction the coalition will go. In addition, a coalition with 
Maliki leading the way just may help separate Iraq‘s interests from Iran. Despite 
the ties between Iraq‘s political parties and Iran, the ISCI and the Da‘wa Party do 
remain nationalist and thus, are likely to resist direct, or indirect, orders from Iran. 
If all else fails, Iraq has political checks in place to prevent religion from being the 
main source of law in Iraq.147 
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However, continuing to state their opposition to the Iranian government 
being entrenched in Iraqi affairs could prove troublesome for the stability of the 
nation. The more Iraq tries to assert its independence from Iran, the more Iranians 
can fuel the fire of the armed conflicts in Iraq to cause even more instability in this 
fragile government.148 Tehran has supplied weapons to the Shiite insurgency, but 
has not provided many sophisticated weapons, nor does it attack US forces nearly 
as often as it attack Sunni militias.149 
 
Economic Options 
Economically, Iraq has to take many steps to curb Iranian influence. As 
shown in Chapter 3, Iran has become entrenched in the Iraqi economy, either 
through providing reconstruction funds or supplying electricity. Although Iraq has 
benefitted from these donations from the IRGC, it has also indebted them to the 
IRGC. For this reason, Iraq has to try to diversify its incoming funding for 
reconstruction. 
One step Iraq could take is to appeal to the United Nations and other states 
to assist it with reconstruction. Although this would put Iraq in debt to several 
nations – though debt is unavoidable at this point – Iraq would not be beholden to 
one state to repay its debts. Thus, one state could not control the direction that Iraq 
takes. Compromises would have to be made and Iraq would be inclined to be a more 
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centrist country, as far as policy making.  However, most immediate is Iraq‘s need 
to stop receiving its electricity from Iran. As Iran has already proved, it is willing to 
turn the electricity off, should Iraq divert from Iranian plans. Iraq has to 
reconstruct or build new electricity grids and control the electricity itself. 
Iraq should also curb the Iranian influence by reinstituting tariffs on 
imported goods – particularly from Iran, but for the sake of fairness, to every nation 
that wants to sell its product in Iraq.  Perhaps Iraq could lower taxes to nations who 
helped the reconstruction process, so it can insulate its domestic businesses in order 
to make them strong again. Iran is undermining the local businesses, causing Iraq 
to be increasingly more dependent on it and its products because they are sold at 
such low prices. The head of the Kurdistan Contractors‘ Association, Nowruz al-
Khaffaf, says that he wants the Iraqi government to protect local farmers by 
limiting Iranian imports.150 
Realistically speaking, however, it is highly unlikely that Iraq can completely 
disregard the role of Iran in the state, nor is that a goal that Iraq wants to achieve. 
Therefore, there are steps that both Iraq and Iran can take to achieve a medium 
that can reasonably please all parties.  Some suggest that the United States should 
form a working relationship with Iran in order to promote and keep stability in 
Iraq. By no means should the United States ignore Iran‘s goals in Iraq. However, 
considering the extensive violence and instability present in the nation, assistance 
from neighboring countries would be invaluable.151 In addition, as suggested above, 
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the United States should help form a coalition among all of Iraq‘s neighbors which 
would serve as an informal committee in order to advise the blossoming Iraqi 
















CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Understanding how the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – and Iran as a 
whole – is affecting Iraq is crucial in understanding what path Iraq must take in 
order to combat it.  It is also invaluable for other nations to understand the ongoing 
effects in order to be able to assist Iraq, should they request it. Assistance, whether 
military, political, or economic, may have to be an option for Iraq due to its current 
instability coupled with the immense strength of the IRGC. However, this is not to 
imply that the United States is solely responsible for this assistance although it 
may be partially necessary for a time. 
 Iran has been training members for the IRGC in its own country for 32 years. 
Between the Quds, the Baseej, and the three branches of IRGC forces, Iran is 
strongly entrenched in Iranian life. The Baseej militia, in particular, has had the 
most domestic effect. Indoctrination begins at a very young age, with the Pupils.153 
Thus, the IRGC ensures its ideas are incorporated at every level of a citizen‘s life. 
As a whole, the IRGC is especially powerful today since President Ahmadinejad has 
appointed several key members to state-level and gubernatorial positions.154 
Furthermore, several members of the IRGC have been specifically targeted by UN 
resolutions as having key positions in Iran‘s quest for nuclear capabilities.155 
Alternatively, the Quds force has had great power outside of Iran‘s borders, carrying 
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out international missions and training others who engage in terrorist activities, 
such as Hezbollah and JAM, under Sadr. The Quds have been especially successful 
in causing further unrest in Iraq, through funding several Shiite militias and 
providing several weapons.156 
  Furthermore, the Quds are using Shiite militias not only to attack Sunnis 
but also to combat US soldiers, who are compared to Israelis that occupy Palestine. 
Many of the militias in Iraq being funded by the IRGC are receiving between half a 
million and 3 million dollars per year for arms and training.157 It is increasingly 
difficult for the Iraqi military and the United States to combat the increasing 
number of Quds members in Iraq, as well as the militias on their payroll. 
 Politically, Iraq is in a precarious position because many members of the 
government were once Iraqi exiles in Iran. Therefore, once the debaathification 
process took place, it was simple to have a Shiite majority win the elections and 
thus, have many members who feel beholden to Iran. The situation is made even 
more complex when one considers that Sadr, the radical cleric leader of JAM, is 
included in the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)158 and was a force to be reckoned with in 
the negotiation arena.  The last two Iraqi Prime Ministers, including Nouri al-
Maliki, are members of the Da‘wa Party.159 The Da‘wa Party was started by Iraqi 
exiles in Iran and assisted by the Quds until a fall out which split the party into 
Da‘wa and ISCI.160 
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 Economically, Iran is doing the most damage to Iraq. Because Iraq does not 
impose import tariffs, and Iran subsidizes all its exports to Iraq, many of Iraq‘s 
domestic industries are failing at a rapid pace. This is especially dangerous because 
of the spike in unemployment, which significantly heightens the likelihood of Iraqi 
men joining militias in order to support their families. Furthermore, Iran has 
opened several banks in cities around Iraq, one of which – Bank Melli – has been 
tagged as a source of the Quds funding and also the purchaser of materials for 
Iran‘s nuclear ambitions.161 
 Iran‘s control of a good portion of the electricity of Iraq has also caused many 
problems. Those cities are dependent on Iran to function and, in that situation, it is 
extremely difficult to combat the IRGC‘s influence when they can just simply shut 
the power to entire cities, as Basra was shown.162 Iranian electricity is also 
projected to grow in subsequent years, something which Iraq should seek to avoid 
with fervor. It is crucial for Iraq to have control of its electricity in order to not be 
forced to subject itself to the IRGC. 
 Socially, the IRGC is already taking over in many areas of Iraq, particularly 
the South. Women are being forced to wear hijab and unaccompanied, unmarried 
couples are being harassed, beaten, or even killed.163 Furthermore, since Iran is 
funding reconstruction efforts for Najaf and Karbala, it could be attempting to 
influence what teachings emerge from the many hawzas there by enforcing a more 
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Khomeinist tradition of involvement in politics as opposed to the Quietist tradition 
that has been more prominent in Iraq thus far.164  
 Iran is also using the media to influence the views of many Iraqi. Two 
stations in particular, Al-Alam and Al-Sahar, broadcast in Iraq with anti-US and/or 
anti-Israel propaganda and both support Hezbollah and Hamas. Although it is 
difficult to measure how much of an effect the propaganda is having on public 
opinion, media is always a difficult tool to combat, although it is all too easy to 
manipulate.  Now known as al-Kawthwar, Al-Sahar has been broadcasting as early 
as 1997. Although it has remained fairly neutral on Iraqi affairs, it is the most 
vehemently anti-Israeli station out of the two mentioned.165 
 The IRGC is attacking from all sides in Iraq and, despite the assistance from 
the US, is becoming increasingly troublesome. Although no sources claim that Iraq 
can be completely free from any Iranian influence, as the country is next door, there 
are steps that Iraq can take in order to mitigate the level of influence and retain its 
autonomy. Militarily, Iraq can continue what the United States has done and hire 
some of the already present militias, such as The Wolf Brigade or Al-Sahwa, to oust 
the Quds forces from the country.166 Though this is a risky move, because not all of 
the militias can be hired permanently into the security forces, at the present time it 
is a viable choice. However, Iraq will have to find a way to fairly incorporate a few 
members from each ethnic and religious background to the security forces in order 
to keep from marginalizing any one group and causing further sectarian violence.  
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 Iraq will also have to attempt to foster stronger nationalistic identities within 
the members of the government in order to end the loyalties that many have 
towards Iran. This may be easier to do for some members, such as Maliki, because 
despite their friendly rhetoric, they may hold some resentment towards Iran. In 
Maliki‘s case, his experience at Ahwaz has created his distrust for Iran, and 
particularly the Quds force.167 
 As mentioned above, Iraq has to acquire and maintain control of all the 
electricity in the country. However, Iraq also has to take steps in order to combat 
the Iranian takeover of its economy. The simplest way to achieve this is through 
import tariffs. Iraq could also achieve this by diversifying where it gets its funding 
for different projects. For example, it may create incentives for different nations to 
invest in reconstruction projects by lowering some tariffs, but never so much so that 
it enables said nation to sell its product for less than the equivalent domestic good.  
 The case study of Iraq, as it is being affected by the IRGC, is clearly 
composed of many complicated, interwoven aspects. Each area where the IRGC 
pushes its influence in affects multiple areas of Iraqi life – such as political, 
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 Because of IRGC‘s ongoing political influence, the Iraqi government is more 
accepting towards engaging in talks and agreements with Iran. Though this is not 
necessarily a negative occurrence, it can prove to be detrimental towards Iraq, 
should Iran gain most of the benefits from the agreements. One such agreement 
between the nations is assurances that Iraq will prevent the Mujahedin Khalq 
Organization (MEK) – Iranian exiles in Iraq – from crossing into Iran while Iran 
prevents terrorists groups from entering Iraq through Iran.168 However, the 
agreement is rather one sided given that the Quds are supplying weapons to Iraqi 
militia groups, thus funding the terrorists that are already present. 
In addition, Iran‘s political influence on Iraqi leaders is proving to have a 
stronger effect. During Jalal Talabani‘s presidency, he was able to visit Tehran and 
meet with President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.169 
Talabani was the first Iraqi to be able to visit Iran in nearly forty years, fueling US 
concerns about the growing closeness between the two nations. Many leaders are 
speaking about how Iran and Iraq will only grow closer and few are speaking out 
about the growing pervasive Iranian presence.170  
In the economy, the IRGC‘s political influence is preventing Iraq from 
passing legislation that would create protections for Iraq‘s domestic goods. Although 
this would be helpful for Iraq to save its economy, it would end Iran‘s hold on it; 
thus, it is not conducive to Iranian aspirations.  Iran‘s subsidies on its goods enables 
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it to have cheaper prices than domestic goods while their import tariff of 150% 
keeps Iraqi goods out of Iran.171 
The masses are also affected by the political influence because of the Shiite 
led government. Shiites voted for Shiites in Iraq during the election and, with a 
Shiite majority, a Shiite government was elected. Many of the members were 
previous exiles in Iran. The masses are being affected by the lack of action of the 
government to protect them against the IRGC‘s influence. Furthermore, the Iranian 
TV stations that broadcast anti-Israeli and anti-US propaganda in Iraq only serve 
to heighten the tensions and influence public opinion towards violence. 
The IRGC‘s military influence in Iraq causes no fewer problems. The Iraqi 
government has to feel the brunt of the violence the IRGC promotes and funds. 
Furthermore, with the militias already having significant influence, it is difficult for 
the Iraqi government to attempt containment or expulsion for fear that said militias 
will only incite more violence and unrest. Iraqi leaders are aware that the IRGC 
funded militias could easily cause more instability in Iraq and therefore, are 
reluctant to induce any major change that may provoke them. Without assistance 
from other nations, it is unlikely that this pattern will change. 
The Iraqi economy is also affected by the military because any instability 
within a nation is going to cause dramatic change to its economy. The constant 
violence causes lack of employment and stable income, leading Iraqis to buy the 
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cheapest goods possible. The cheapest goods in Iraq are Iranian goods due to 
previously discussed subsidies. In a vicious cycle, the Iraqi public is affected because 
they must buy cheap Iranian goods, which does not give the economy any chance to 
grow and stabilize itself. 
The religious and social influence that the IRGC is having on Iraq further 
destabilizes the society by holding power over the Shiite government and causing 
the leaders of the government to support Iran, one of Iran‘s goals. The social 
influence, particularly in the South, may cause a change in social values regarding 
the economy and causing it to remain weak in comparison to Iran and other 
surrounding nations. Also, the IRGC has swept into southern Iraq and has begun 
imposing Sharia law on the citizens.172 With the effect that the IRGC has had on 
the government, the Sunni minority is now becoming marginalized, and in some 
cases targeted, by their own government. The religious aspect of the IRGC is one of 
the most difficult to combat because a close link exists between those of the Shiite 
faith due to their persistent minority within the Muslim world. 
Finally, the IRGC‘s economic influence can be felt throughout Iraq. The Iraqi 
government and leaders are unwilling to combat the economic influence through 
tariffs due to the lack of strength of Iraq‘s economy, but also because of the threat of 
escalating violence by the IRGC. With this lack of protectionist policies, the Iraqi 
economy continues to plummet, continuing the cycle of dependence upon Iranian 
goods and services.173 Many businesses are failing because they cannot compete 
51 
  
with Iranian goods and much of the public is unemployed and willing to work for 
violent militias if it means they can feed their families.  
In attempting to ascertain in what ways the IRGC is influencing Iraq and 
how much power they already hold, it is daunting to find that their power is 
continually growing. Furthermore, in trying to find a way to combat the situation, 
one is only faced with more questions. How can Iraq combat the military influence 
of Iran without causing more damage to an already unstable economy and public 
space? How can Iraq diversify its funds for reconstruction so as not to be beholden 
to Iran? These questions lead one to conjecture about Iraq‘s future as a nation and 
its place as an autonomous, self-reliant country in the eyes of the world. Further 
studies should be undertaken to examine the questions that have arisen from this 
research. However, one truth will remain: Iraq, and the IRGC, will continue to be a 
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